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Abstract
We propose new privacy attacks to infer attributes (e.g.,
locations, occupations, and interests) of online social net-
work users. Our attacks leverage seemingly innocent
user information that is publicly available in online so-
cial networks to infer missing attributes of targeted users.
Given the increasing availability of (seemingly innocent)
user information online, our results have serious impli-
cations for Internet privacy – private attributes can be in-
ferred from users’ publicly available data unless we take
steps to protect users from such inference attacks.
To infer attributes of a targeted user, existing infer-
ence attacks leverage either the user’s publicly available
social friends or the user’s behavioral records (e.g., the
webpages that the user has liked on Facebook, the apps
that the user has reviewed on Google Play), but not both.
As we will show, such inference attacks achieve limited
success rates. However, the problem becomes qualita-
tively different if we consider both social friends and be-
havioral records. To address this challenge, we develop
a novel model to integrate social friends and behavioral
records and design new attacks based on our model. We
theoretically and experimentally demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our attacks. For instance, we observe that,
in a real-world large-scale dataset with 1.1 million users,
our attack can correctly infer the cities a user lived in for
57% of the users; via confidence estimation, we are able
to increase the attack success rate to over 90% if the at-
tacker selectively attacks a half of the users. Moreover,
we show that our attack can correctly infer attributes for
significantly more users than previous attacks.
1 Introduction
Online social networks (e.g., Facebook, Google+, and
Twitter) have become increasingly important platforms
for users to interact with each other, process information,
and diffuse social influence. A user in an online social
network essentially has a list of social friends, a digital
record of behaviors, and a profile. For instance, behav-
ioral records could be a list of pages liked or shared by
the user on Facebook, or they could be a set of mobile
apps liked or rated by the user in Google+ or Google
Play. A profile introduces the user’s self-declared at-
tributes such as majors, employers, and cities lived. To
address users’ privacy concerns, online social network
operators provide users with fine-grained privacy set-
tings, e.g., a user could limit some attributes to be acces-
sible only to his/her friends. Moreover, a user could also
create an account without providing any attribute infor-
mation. As a result, an online social network is a mixture
of both public and private user information.
One privacy attack of increasing interest revolves
around these user attributes [18, 27, 46, 39, 15, 33, 11,
26, 42, 29, 8, 25, 20, 21, 23]. In this attribute infer-
ence attack, an attacker aims to propagate attribute in-
formation of social network users with publicly visi-
ble attributes to users with missing or incomplete at-
tribute data. Specifically, the attacker could be any party
(e.g., cyber criminal, online social network provider, ad-
vertiser, data broker, and surveillance agency) who has
interests in users’ private attributes. To perform such
privacy attacks, the attacker only needs to collect pub-
licly available data from online social networks. Apart
from privacy risks, the inferred user attributes can also
be used to perform various security-sensitive activities
such as spear phishing [37] and attacking personal infor-
mation based backup authentication [17]. Moreover, an
attacker can leverage the inferred attributes to link on-
line users across multiple sites [4, 14, 2, 13] or with of-
fline records (e.g., publicly available voter registration
records) [38, 32] to form composite user profiles, result-
ing in even bigger security and privacy risks.
Existing attribute inference attacks can be roughly
classified into two categories, friend-based [18, 27, 46,
39, 15, 33, 11, 26, 20, 21, 23] and behavior-based [42,
29, 8, 25]. Friend-based attacks are based on the intu-
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ition of you are who you know. Specifically, they aim to
infer attributes for a user using the publicly available user
attributes of the user’s friends (or all other users in the so-
cial network) and the social structure among them. The
foundation of friend-based attacks is homophily, mean-
ing that two linked users share similar attributes [30]. For
instance, if more than half of friends of a user major in
Computer Science at a certain university, the user might
also major in Computer Science at the same university
with a high probability. Behavior-based attacks infer at-
tributes for a user based on the public attributes of users
that are similar to him/her, and the similarities between
users are identified by using their behavioral data. The
intuition behind behavior-based attacks is you are how
you behave. In particular, users with the same attributes
have similar interests, characteristics, and cultures so that
they have similar behaviors. For instance, if a user liked
apps, books, and music tracks on Google Play that are
similar to those liked by users originally from China, the
user might also be from China. Likewise, previous mea-
surement study [43] found that some apps are only pop-
ular in certain cities, implying the possibility of inferring
cities a user lived in using the apps the user used or liked.
However, these inference attacks consider either so-
cial friendship structures or user behaviors, but not both,
and thus they achieve limited inference accuracy as we
will show in our experiments. Moreover, the problem
of inferring user attributes becomes qualitatively differ-
ent if we consider both social structures and user behav-
iors because features derived from them differ from each
other, show different sparsity, and are at different scales.
We show in our evaluation that simply concatenating fea-
tures from the two sources of information regresses the
overall results and reduces attack success rates.
Our work: In this work, we aim to combine social
structures and user behaviors to infer user attributes.
To this end, we first propose a social-behavior-attribute
(SBA) network model to gracefully integrate social struc-
tures, user behaviors, and user attributes in a unified
framework. Specifically, we add additional nodes to a
social structure, each of which represents an attribute or
a behavior; a link between a user and an attribute node
represents that the user has the corresponding attribute,
and that a user has a behavior is encoded by a link be-
tween the user and the corresponding behavior node.
Second, we design a vote distribution attack (VIAL)
under the SBA model to perform attribute inference.
Specifically, VIAL iteratively distributes a fixed vote ca-
pacity from a targeted user whose attributes we want to
infer to all other users in the SBA network. A user re-
ceives a high vote capacity if the user and the targeted
user are structurally similar in the SBA network, e.g.,
they have similar social structures and/or have performed
similar behaviors. Then, each user votes for its attributes
via dividing its vote capacity to them. We predict the tar-
get user to own attributes that receive the highest votes.
Third, we evaluate VIAL both theoretically and em-
pirically; and we extensively compare VIAL with several
previous attacks for inferring majors, employers, and lo-
cations using a large-scale dataset with 1.1 million users
collected from Google+ and Google Play. For instance,
we observe that our attack can correctly infer the cities
a user lived in for 57% of the users; via confidence esti-
mation, we are able to increase the success rate to over
90% if the attacker selectively attacks a half of the users.
Moreover, we find that our attack VIAL substantially
outperforms previous attacks. Specifically, for Precision,
VIAL improves upon friend-based attacks and behavior-
based attacks by over 20% and around 100%, respec-
tively. These results imply that an attacker can use our
attack to successfully infer private attributes of substan-
tially more users than previous attacks.
In summary, our key contributions are as follows:
• We propose the social-behavior-attribute (SBA) net-
work model to integrate social structures, user be-
haviors, and user attributes.
• We design the vote distribution attack (VIAL) under
the SBA model to perform attribute inference.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of VIAL both the-
oretically and empirically. Moreover, we observe
that VIAL correctly infers attributes for substan-
tially more users than previous attacks via eval-
uations on a large-scale dataset collected from
Google+ and Google Play.
2 Problem Definition and Threat Model
Attackers: The attacker could be any party who has in-
terests in user attributes. For instance, the attacker could
be a cyber criminal, online social network provider, ad-
vertiser, data broker, or surveillance agency. Cyber crim-
inals can leverage user attributes to perform targeted so-
cial engineering attacks (now often referred to as spear
phishing attacks [37]) and attacking personal information
based backup authentication [17]; online social network
providers and advertisers could use the user attributes
for targeted advertisements; data brokers make profit via
selling the user attribute information to other parties such
as advertisers, banking companies, and insurance indus-
tries [1]; and surveillance agency can use the attributes
to identify users and monitor their activities.
Collecting publicly available social structures and be-
haviors: To perform attribute inference attacks, an at-
tacker first needs to collect publicly available informa-
tion. In particular, in our attacks, an attacker needs to
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collect social structures, user profiles, and user behav-
iors from online social networks. Such information can
be collected via writing web crawlers or leveraging APIs
developed by the service providers. Next, we formally
describe these publicly available information.
We use an undirected1 graph Gs = (Vs,Es) to repre-
sent a social structure, where edges in Es represent so-
cial relationships between the nodes in Vs. We denote
by Γu,S = {v|(u,v) ∈ Es} as the set of social neighbors
of u. In addition to social network structure, we have
behaviors and categorical attributes for nodes. For in-
stance, in our Google+ and Google Play dataset, nodes
are Google+ users, and edges represent friendship be-
tween users; behaviors include the set of items (e.g.,
apps, books, and movies) that users rated or liked on
Google Play; and node attributes are derived from user
profile information and include fields such as major, em-
ployer, and cities lived.
We use binary representation for user behaviors.
Specifically, we treat various objects (e.g., the Android
app “Angry Birds”, the movie “The Lord of the Rings”,
and the webpage “facebook.com”) as binary variables,
and we denote by mb the total number of objects. Behav-
iors of a node u are then represented as a mb-dimensional
binary column vector ~bu with the ith entry equal to 1
when u has performed a certain action on the ith object
(positive behavior) and −1 when u does not perform the
action on it (negative behavior). For instance, when we
consider user review behaviors for Google+ users, ob-
jects could be items such as apps, books, and movies
available in Google Play, and the action is review; 1 rep-
resents that the user reviewed the corresponding item and
-1 means the opposite. For Facebook users, objects could
be webpages; 1 represents that the user liked or shared
the corresponding webpage and -1 means that the user
did not. We denote by B = [~b1 ~b2 · · ·~bns ] the behavior
matrix for all nodes.
We distinguish between attributes and attribute val-
ues. For instance, major, employer, and location are dif-
ferent attributes; and each attribute could have multiple
attribute values, e.g., major could be Computer Science,
Biology, or Physics. A user might own a few attribute
values for a single attribute. For example, a user that
studies Physics for undergraduate education but chooses
to pursue a Ph.D. degree in Computer Science has two
values for the attribute major. Again, we use a binary
representation for each attribute value, and we denote
the number of distinct attribute values as ma. Then at-
tribute information of a node u is represented as a ma-
dimensional binary column vector ~au with the ith entry
equal to 1 when u has the ith attribute value (positive
attribute) and −1 when u does not have it (negative at-
1Our attacks can also be generalized to directed graphs.
tribute). We denote by A = [~a1 ~a2 · · ·~ans ] the attribute
matrix for all nodes.
Attribute inference attacks: Roughly speaking, an at-
tribute inference attack is to infer the attributes of a set
of targeted users using the collected publicly available
information. Formally, we define an attribute inference
attack as follows:
Definition 1 (Attribute Inference Attack). Suppose we
are given T = (Gs,A,B), which is a snapshot of a so-
cial network Gs with a behavior matrix B and an at-
tribute matrix A, and a list of targeted users Vt with so-
cial friends Γv,S and binary behavior vectors ~bv for all
v ∈ Vt , the attribute inference attack is to infer the at-
tribute vectors~av for all v ∈Vt .
We note that a user setting the friend list to be pri-
vate could also be vulnerable to inference attacks. This
is because the user’s friends could set their friend lists
publicly available. The attacker can collect a social rela-
tionship between two users if at least one of them sets the
friend list to be public. Moreover, we assume the users
and the service providers are not taking other steps (e.g.,
obfuscating social friends [19] or behaviors [42, 9]) to
defend against inference attacks.
Applying inferred attributes to link users across
multiple online social networks and with offline
records: We stress that an attacker could leverage our
attribute inference attacks to further perform other at-
tacks. For instance, a user might provide different at-
tributes on different online social networks. Thus, an
attacker could combine user attributes across multiple
online social networks to better profile users, and an at-
tacker could leverage the inferred user attributes to do
so [4, 14, 2, 13]. Moreover, an attacker can further use
the inferred user attributes to link online users with of-
fline records (e.g., voter registration records) [38, 32],
which results in even bigger security and privacy risks,
e.g., more sophisticated social engineering attacks. We
note that even if the inferred user attributes (e.g., major,
employer) seem not private for some targeted users, an
attacker could use them to link users across multiple on-
line sites and with offline records.
3 Social-Behavior-Attribute Framework
We describe our social-behavior-attribute (SBA) network
model, which integrates social structures, user behaviors,
and user attributes in a unified framework. To perform
our inference attacks, an attacker needs to construct a
SBA network from his/her collected publicly available
social structures, user attributes, and behaviors.
Given a social network Gs = (Vs,Es) with mb behavior
objects, a behavior matrix B, ma distinct attribute val-
ues, and an attribute matrix A, we create an augmented
3
social node attribute node
social link attribute link
u1 u2 u6u5u4u3
behavior node
behavior link
WhatsApp Messager Facebook PinterestAngry Birds
Computer Science Male Biology Google Inc.
Figure 1: Social-behavior-attribute network.
network by adding mb additional nodes to Gs, with each
node corresponding to a behavior object, and another ma
additional nodes to Gs, with each additional node corre-
sponding to an attribute value. For each node u in Gs with
positive attribute a or positive behavior b, we create an
undirected link between u and the additional node corre-
sponding to a or b in the augmented network. Moreover,
we add the targeted users into the augmented network
by connecting them to their friends and the additional
nodes corresponding to their positive behaviors. We call
this augmented network social-behavior-attribute (SBA)
network since it integrates the interactions among social
structures, user behaviors, and user attributes.
Nodes in the SBA framework corresponding to nodes
in Gs or targeted users in Vt are called social nodes,
nodes representing behavior objects are called behavior
nodes, and nodes representing attribute values are called
attribute nodes. Moreover, we use S, B, and A to repre-
sent the three types of nodes, respectively. Links between
social nodes are called social links, links between social
nodes and behavior nodes are called behavior links, and
links between social nodes and attribute nodes are called
attribute links. Note that there are no links between be-
havior nodes and attribute nodes. Fig. 1 illustrates an
example SBA network, in which the two social nodes u5
and u6 correspond to two targeted users. The behavior
nodes in this example correspond to Android apps, and
a behavior link represents that the corresponding user
used the corresponding app. Intuitively, the SBA frame-
work explicitly describes the sharing of behaviors and
attributes across social nodes.
We also place weights on various links in the SBA
framework. These link weights balance the influence of
social links versus behavior links versus attribute links.2
For instance, weights on social links could represent the
tie strengths between social nodes. Users with stronger
tie strengths could be more likely to share the same at-
tribute values. The weight on a behavior link could in-
2In principle, we could also assign weights to nodes to incorporate
their relative importance. However, our attack does not rely on node
weights, so we do not discuss them.
dicate the predictiveness of the behavior in terms of the
user’s attributes. In other words, a behavior link with a
higher weight means that performing the corresponding
behavior better predicts the attributes of the user. For in-
stance, if we want to predict user gender, the weight of
the link between a female user and a mobile app track-
ing women’s monthly periods could be larger than the
weight of the link between a male user and the app.
Weights on attribute links can represent the degree of
affinity between users and attribute values. For instance,
an attribute link connecting the user’s hometown could
have a higher weight than the attribute link connecting a
city where the user once travelled. We discuss how link
weights can be learnt via machine learning in Section 8.
We denote a SBA network as G= (V,E,w, t), where V
is the set of nodes, n = |V | is the total number of nodes,
E is the set of links, m = |E| is the total number of links,
w is a function that maps a link to its link weight, i.e.,
wuv is the weight of link (u,v), and t a function that maps
a node to its node type, i.e., tu is the node type of u. For
instance, tu = S means that u is a social node. Addition-
ally, for a given node u in the SBA network, we denote by
Γu, Γu,S, Γu,B, and Γu,A respectively the sets of all neigh-
bors, social neighbors, behavior neighbors, and attribute
neighbors of u. Moreover, for links that are incident from
u, we use du, du,S, du,B, and du,A to denote the sum of
weights of all links, weights of links connecting social
neighbors, weights of links connecting behavior neigh-
bors, and weights of links connecting attribute neighbors,
respectively. More specifically, we have du = ∑v∈Γu wuv
and du,Y = ∑v∈Γu,Y wuv, where Y = S,B,A.
Furthermore, we define two types of hop-2 social
neighbors of a social node u, which share common be-
havior neighbors or attribute neighbors with u. In par-
ticular, a social node v is called a behavior-sharing so-
cial neighbor of u if v and u share at least one com-
mon behavior neighbor. For instance, in Fig. 1, both
u2 and u4 are behavior-sharing social neighbors of u1.
We denote the set of behavior-sharing social neighbors
of u as Γu,BS. Similarly, we denote the set of attribute-
sharing social neighbors of u as Γu,AS. Formally, we have
Γu,BS={v|t(v)= S & Γv,B∩Γu,B 6= /0} and Γu,AS={v|t(v)=
S & Γv,A∩Γu,A 6= /0}. We note that our definitions of Γu,BS
and Γu,AS also include the social node u itself. These no-
tations will be useful in describing our attack.
4 Vote Distribution Attack (VIAL)
4.1 Overview
Suppose we are given a SBA network G which also in-
cludes the social structures and behaviors of the targeted
users, our goal is to infer attributes for every targeted
user. Specifically, for each targeted user v, we compute
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the similarity between v and each attribute value, and
then we predict that v owns the attribute values that have
the highest similarity scores. In a high-level abstraction,
VIAL works in two phases.
• Phase I. VIAL iteratively distributes a fixed vote
capacity from the targeted user v to the rest of users
in Phase I. The intuitions are that a user receives a
high vote capacity if the user and the targeted user
are structurally similar in the SBA network (e.g.,
share common friends and behaviors), and that the
targeted user is more likely to have the attribute val-
ues belonging to users with higher vote capacities.
After Phase I, we obtain a vote capacity vector ~sv,
where~svu is the vote capacity of user u.
• Phase II. Intuitively, if a user with a certain vote ca-
pacity has more attribute values, then, according to
the information of this user alone, the likelihood of
each of these attribute values belonging to the tar-
geted user decreases. Moreover, an attribute value
should receive more votes if more users with higher
vote capacities have the attribute value. Therefore,
in Phase II, each social node votes for its attribute
values via dividing its vote capacity among them,
and each attribute value sums the vote capacities
that are divided to it by its social neighbors. We
treat the summed vote capacity of an attribute value
as its similarity with v. Finally, we predict v has the
attribute values that receive the highest votes.
4.2 Phase I
In Phase I, VIAL iteratively distributes a fixed vote ca-
pacity from the targeted user v to the rest of users. We
denote by~s(i)v the vote capacity vector in the ith iteration,
where ~s(i)vu is the vote capacity of node u in the ith itera-
tion. Initially, v has a vote capacity |Vs| and all other so-
cial nodes have vote capacities of 0. Formally, we have:
~s(0)vu =
{
|Vs| if u = v
0 otherwise
(1)
In each iteration, VIAL applies three local rules. They
are dividing, backtracking, and aggregating. Intuitively,
if a user u has more (hop-2) social neighbors, then each
neighbor could receive less vote capacity from u. There-
fore, our dividing rule splits a social node’s vote capacity
to its social neighbors and hop-2 social neighbors. The
backtracking rule takes a portion of every social node’s
vote capacity and assigns them back to the targeted user
v, which is based on the intuition that social nodes that
are closer to v in the SBA network are likely to be more
similar to v and should get more vote capacities. A user
could have a higher vote capacity if it is linked to more
social neighbors and hop-2 social neighbors with higher
vote capacities. Thus, for each user u, the aggregating
rule collects the vote capacities that are shared to u by its
social neighbors and hop-2 social neighbors. Fig. 2 illus-
trates the three local rules. Next, we elaborate the three
local rules.
Dividing: A social node u could have social neigh-
bors, behavior-sharing social neighbors, and attribute-
sharing social neighbors. To distinguish them, we use
three weights wS, wBS, and wAS to represent the shares
of them, respectively. For instance, the total vote ca-
pacity shared to social neighbors of u in the tth itera-
tion is ~s(i−1)vu × wSwS+wBS+wAS . Then we further divide the
vote capacity among each type of neighbors according
to their link weights. We define Iu,Y = 1 if the set of
neighbors Γu,Y is non-empty, otherwise Iu,Y = 0, where
Y = S,BS,AS. The variables Iu,S, Iu,BS, and Iu,AS are used
to consider the scenarios where u does not have some
type(s) of neighbors, in which u’s vote capacity is di-
vided among less than three types of social neighbors.
For convenience, we denote wT = wSIu,S +wBSIu,BS +
wASIu,AS.
• Social neighbors. A social neighbor x ∈ Γu,S re-
ceives a higher vote capacity from u if their link
weight (e.g., tie strength) is higher. Therefore, we
model the vote capacity p(i)v (u,x) that is divided to
x by u in the ith iteration as:
p(i)v (u,x) =~s
(i−1)
vu · wSwT ·
wux
du,S
, (2)
where du,S is the summation of weights of social
links that are incident from u.
• Behavior-sharing social neighbors. A behavior-
sharing social neighbor x ∈ Γu,BS receives a higher
vote capacity from u if they share more behavior
neighbors with higher predictiveness. Thus, we
model vote capacity q(i)v (u,x) that is divided to x by
u in the ith iteration as:
q(i)v (u,x) =~s
(i−1)
vu · wBSwT ·wB(u,x), (3)
where wB(u,x) = ∑y∈Γu,B∩Γx,B
wuy
du,B
· wxydy,S , represent-
ing the overall share of vote capacity that u divides
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to x because of their common behavior neighbors.
Specifically, wuydu,B characterizes the fraction of vote
capacity u divides to the behavior neighbor y and
wxy
dy,S
characterizes the fraction of vote capacity y di-
vides to x. Large weights of wuy and wxy indicate
y is a predictive behavior of the attribute values of
u and x, and having more such common behavior
neighbors make x share more vote capacity from u.
• Attribute-sharing social neighbors. An attribute-
sharing social neighbor x ∈ Γu,AS receives a higher
vote capacity from u if they share more attribute
neighbors with higher degree of affinity. Thus, we
model vote capacity r(i)v (u,x) that is divided to x by
u in the ith iteration as:
r(i)v (u,x) =~s
(i−1)
vu · wASwT ·wA(u,x), (4)
where wA(u,x) = ∑y∈Γu,A∩Γx,A
wuy
du,A
· wxydy,S , represent-
ing the overall share of vote capacity that u divides
to x because of their common attribute neighbors.
Specifically, wuydu,A characterizes the fraction of vote
capacity u divides to the attribute neighbor y and
wxy
dy,S
characterizes the fraction of vote capacity y di-
vides to x. Large weights of wuy and wxy indicate
y is an attribute value with a high degree of affin-
ity, and having more such common attribute values
make x share more vote capacity from u.
We note that a social node x could be multiple types
of social neighbors of u (e.g., x could be social neighbor
and behavior-sharing social neighbor of u), in which x
receives multiple shares of vote capacity from u and we
sum them as x’s final share of vote capacity.
Backtracking: For each social node u, the backtrack-
ing rule takes a portion α of u’s vote capacity back to
the targeted user v. Specifically, the vote capacity back-
tracked to v from u is α~s(i−1)vu . Considering backtracking,
the vote capacity divided to the social neighbor x of u in
the dividing step is modified as (1−α)p(i)v (u,x). Sim-
ilarly, the vote capacities divided to a behavior-sharing
social neighbor and an attribute-sharing social neighbor
x are modified as (1−α)q(i)v (u,x) and (1−α)r(i)v (u,x),
respectively. We call the parameter α backtracking
strength. A larger backtracking strength enforces more
vote capacity to be distributed among the social nodes
that are closer to v in the SBA network. α = 0 means
no backtracking. We will show that, via both theoretical
and empirical evaluations, VIAL achieves better accu-
racy with backtracking.
We can verify that ∑x∈Γu,S
wux
du,S
= 1, ∑x∈Γu,BS wB(u,x) =
1, and ∑x∈Γu,AS wA(u,x) = 1 for every user u in the di-
viding step. In other words, every user divides all its
Algorithm 1: Phase I of VIAL
Input: G = (V,E,w, t), M, v, ε , and α .
Output: ~sv.
1 begin
2 //Initializing the vote capacity vector.
3 for u ∈Vs do
4 if u = v then
5 ~s(0)vu ←− |Vs|
6 else
7 ~s(0)vu ←− 0
8 end
9 end
10 error←− 1
11 while error > ε do
12 ~s(i)v ←− α~ev+(1−α)MT~s(i−1)v
13 error←− |~s(i)v −~s(i−1)v |/|Vs|
14 end
15 return~s(i)v
16 end
vote capacity to its neighbors (including the user itself if
the user has hop-2 social neighbors). Therefore, the to-
tal vote capacity keeps unchanged in every iteration, and
the vote capacity that is backtracked to the targeted user
is α|Vs|.
Aggregating: The aggregating rule computes a new
vote capacity for u by aggregating the vote capacities that
are divided to u by its neighbors in the ith iteration. For
the targeted user v, we also collect the vote capacities
that are backtracked from all social nodes. Formally, our
aggregating rule is represented as Equation 5.
Matrix representation: We derive the Phase I of our
attack using matrix terminologies, which makes it easier
to iteratively compute the vote capacities. Towards this
end, we define a dividing matrix M ∈ R|Vs|×|Vs|, which is
formally represented in Equation 6. The dividing matrix
encodes the dividing rule. Specifically, u divides Mux
fraction of its vote capacity to the neighbor x in the di-
viding step. Note that M includes the dividing rule for all
three types of social neighbors. With the dividing matrix
M, we can represent the backtracking and aggregating
rules in the ith iteration as follows:
~s(i)v = α~ev+(1−α)MT~s(i−1)v , (7)
where~ev is a vector with the vth entry equals |Vs| and all
other entries equal 0, and MT is the transpose of M.
Given an initial vote capacity vector specified in Equa-
tion 1, we iteratively apply Equation 7 until the differ-
ence between the vectors in two consecutive iterations is
smaller than a predefined threshold. Algorithm 1 shows
Phase I of our attack.
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Our aggregating rule to compute the new vote capacity~s(i)vu for u:
~s(i)vu =
{
(1−α)(∑x∈Γu,S p
(i)
v (x,u)+∑x∈Γu,BS q
(i)
v (x,u)+∑x∈Γu,AS r
(i)
v (x,u)) if u 6= v
(1−α)(∑x∈Γu,S p
(i)
v (x,u)+∑x∈Γu,BS q
(i)
v (x,u)+∑x∈Γu,AS r
(i)
v (x,u))+α|Vs| otherwise
(5)
Our dividing matrix:
Mux =
{
δux,S · wSwT ·
wux
du,S
+δux,BS · wBSwT ·wB(u,x)+δux,AS ·
wAS
wT
·wA(u,x) if x ∈ Γu,S∪Γu,BS∪Γu,AS
0 otherwise,
(6)
where δux,Y = 1 if x ∈ Γu,Y , otherwise δux,Y = 0, Y = S,BS,AS.
4.3 Phase II
In Phase I, we obtained a vote capacity for each user. On
one hand, the targeted user could be more likely to share
attribute values with the users with higher vote capaci-
ties. On the other hand, if a user has more attribute val-
ues, then the likelihood of each of these attribute values
belonging to the targeted user could be smaller. For in-
stance, if a user with a high vote capacity once studied in
more universities for undergraduate education, then ac-
cording to this user’s information alone, the likelihood
of the targeted user studying in each of those universities
could be smaller.
Moreover, among a user’s attribute values, an attribute
value that has a higher degree of affinity (represented by
the weight of the corresponding attribute link) with the
user could be more likely to be an attribute value of the
targeted user. For instance, suppose a user once lived in
two cities, one of which is the user’s hometown while
the other of which is a city where the user once travelled;
the user has a high vote capacity because he/she is struc-
turally close (e.g., he/she shares many common friends
with the targeted user) to the targeted user; then the tar-
geted user is more likely to be from the hometown of the
user than from the city the user once travelled.
Therefore, to capture these observations, we divide the
vote capacity of a user to its attribute values in proportion
to the weights of its attribute links; and each attribute
value sums the vote capacities that are divided to it by the
users having the attribute value. Intuitively, an attribute
value receives more votes if more users with higher vote
capacities link to the attribute value via links with higher
weights. Formally, we have
~tva = ∑
u∈Γa,S
~svu · waudu,A , (8)
where~tva is the final votes of the attribute value a, Γa,S is
the set of users who have the attribute value a, du,A is the
sum of weights of attribute links that are incident from u.
We treat the summed votes of an attribute value as its
similarity with v. Finally, we predict v has the attribute
values that receive the highest votes.
4.4 Confidence Estimation
For a targeted user, a confidence estimator takes the final
votes for all attribute values as an input and produces a
confidence score. A higher confidence score means that
attribute inference for the targeted user is more trustwor-
thy. We design a confidence estimator based on cluster-
ing techniques. A targeted user could have multiple at-
tribute values for a single attribute, and our attack could
produce close votes for these attribute values. Therefore,
we design a confidence estimator called clusterness for
our attack. Specifically, we first use a clustering algo-
rithm (e.g., k-means [24]) to group the votes that our at-
tack produces for all candidate attribute values into two
clusters. Then we compute the average vote in each clus-
ter, and the clusterness is the difference between the two
average votes. The intuition of our clusterness is that if
our attack successfully infers the targeted user’s attribute
values, there could be a cluster of attribute values whose
votes are significantly higher than other attribute values’.
Suppose the attacker chooses a confidence threshold
and only predicts attributes for targeted users whose con-
fidence scores are higher than the threshold. Via setting a
larger confidence threshold, the attacker will attack less
targeted users but could achieve a higher success rate. In
other words, an attacker can balance between the success
rates and the number of targeted users to attack via con-
fidence estimation.
5 Theoretical Analysis
We analyze the convergence of VIAL and derive the ana-
lytical forms of vote capacity vectors, discuss the impor-
tance of the backtracking rule, and analyze the complex-
ity of VIAL.
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5.1 Convergence and Analytical Solutions
We first show that for any backtracking strength α ∈
(0,1], the vote capacity vectors converge.
Theorem 1. For any backtracking strength α ∈ (0,1],
the vote capacity vectors ~s(0)v , ~s
(1)
v , ~s
(2)
v , · · · converge,
and the converged vote capacity vector is α(I − (1−
α)MT )−1~ev. Formally, we have:
~sv = lim
i→∞
~s(i)v = α(I− (1−α)MT )−1~ev, (9)
where I is an identity matrix and (I− (1−α)MT )−1 is
the inverse of (I− (1−α)MT ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Next, we analyze the convergence of VIAL and the an-
alytical form of the vote capacity vector when the back-
tracking strength α = 0.
Theorem 2. When α = 0 and the SBA network is con-
nected, the vote capacity vectors ~s(0)v , ~s
(1)
v , ~s
(2)
v , · · · con-
verge, and the converged vote capacity vector is propor-
tional to the unique stationary distribution of the Markov
chain whose transition matrix is M. Mathematically, the
converged vote capacity vector~sv can be represented as:
~sv = |Vs|~pi, (10)
where ~pi is the unique stationary distribution of the
Markov chain whose transition matrix is M.
Proof. See Appendix B.
With Theorem 2, we have the following corollary,
which states that the vote capacity of a user is propor-
tional to its weighted degree for certain assignments of
the shares of social neighbors and hop-2 social neighbors
in the dividing step.
Corollary 1. When α = 0, the SBA network is con-
nected, and for each user u, the shares of social neigh-
bors, behavior-sharing social neighbors, and attribute-
sharing social neighbors in the dividing step are wS =
τ · du,S, wBS = τ · du,B, and wAS = τ · du,A, respectively,
then we have:
~svu = |Vs|duD , (11)
where τ is any positive number, du is the weights of all
links of u and D is the twice of the total weights of all
links in the SBA network, i.e., D = ∑u du.
Proof. See Appendix C.
5.2 Importance of Backtracking
Theorem 2 implies that when there is no backtracking,
the converged vote capacity vector is independent with
the targeted users. In other words, VIAL with no back-
tracking predicts the same attribute values for all targeted
users. This explains why VIAL with no backtracking
achieves suboptimal performance. We will further em-
pirically evaluate the impact of backtracking strength in
our experiments, and we found that VIAL’s performance
significantly degrades when there is no backtracking.
5.3 Time Complexity
The major cost of VIAL is from Phase I, which includes
computing M and iteratively computing the vote capac-
ity vector. M only needs to be computed once and is
applied to all targeted users. M is a sparse matrix with
O(m) non-zero entries, where m is the number of links in
the SBA network. To compute M, for every social node,
we need to go through its social neighbors and hop-2 so-
cial neighbors; and for a hop-2 social neighbor, we need
to go through the common attribute/behavior neighbors
between the social node and the hop-2 social neighbor.
Therefore, the time complexity of computing M is O(m).
Using sparse matrix representation of M, the time
complexity of each iteration (i.e., applying Equation 7)
in computing the vote capacity vector is O(m). There-
fore, the time complexity of computing the vote capacity
vector for one targeted user is O(d ·m), where d is the
number of iterations. Thus, the overall time complexity
of VIAL is O(d ·m) for one targeted user.
6 Data Collection
We collected a dataset from Google+ and Google Play to
evaluate our VIAL attack and previous attacks. Specif-
ically, we collected social structures and user attributes
from Google+, and user review behaviors from Google
Play. Google assigns each user a 21-digit universal ID,
which is used in both Google+ and Google Play. We
first collected a social network with user attributes from
Google+ via iteratively crawling users’ friends. Then we
crawled review data of users in the Google+ dataset. All
the information that we collected is publicly available.
6.1 Google+ Dataset
Each user in Google+ has an outgoing friend list (i.e., “in
your circles”), an incoming friend list (i.e., “have you
in circles”), and a profile. Shortly after Google+ was
launched in late June 2011, Gong et al. [16, 15] began
to crawl daily snapshots of public Google+ social net-
work structure and user profiles (e.g., major, employer,
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and cities lived). Their dataset includes 79 snapshots of
Google+ collected from July 6 to October 11, 2011. Each
snapshot was a large Weakly Connected Component of
Google+ social network at the time of crawling.
We obtained one collected snapshot from Gong et
al. [16, 15]. To better approximate friendships between
users, we construct an undirected social network from
the crawled Google+ dataset via keeping an undirected
link between a user u and v if u is in v’s both incom-
ing friend list and outgoing friend list. After preprocess-
ing, our Google+ dataset consists of 1,111,905 users and
5,328,308 undirected social links.
User attributes: We consider three attributes, major,
employer, and cities lived. We note that, although we fo-
cus on these attributes that are available to us at a large
scale, our attack is also applicable to infer other attributes
such as sexual orientation, political views, and religious
views. Moreover, some targeted users might not view
inferring these attributes as an privacy attack, but an at-
tacker can leverage these attributes to further link users
across online social networks [4, 14, 2, 13] or even link
them with offline records to perform more serious secu-
rity and privacy attacks [38, 32].
We take the strings input by a user in its Google+ pro-
file as attribute values. We found that most attribute val-
ues are owned by a small number of users while some
are owned by a large number of users. Users could fill
in their profiles freely in Google+, which could be one
reason that we observe many infrequent attribute values.
Specifically, different users might have different names
for the same attribute value. For instance, the major of
Computer Science could also be abbreviated as CS by
some users. Indeed, we find that 20,861 users have Com-
puter Science as their major and 556 users have CS as
their major in our dataset. Moreover, small typos (e.g.,
one letter is incorrect) in the free-form inputs make the
same attribute value be treated as different ones. There-
fore, we manually label a set of attribute values.
1) Major. We consider the top-100 majors that are
claimed by the most users. We manually merge the ma-
jors that actually refer to the same one, e.g., Computer
Science and CS, Btech and Biotechnology. After prepro-
cessing, we obtain 62 distinct majors. 8.4% of users in
our dataset have at least one of these majors.
2) Employer. Similar to major, we select the top-100
employers that are claimed by the most users and manu-
ally merge the employers that refer to the same one. We
obtain 78 distinct employers, and 3.1% of users have at
least one of these employers.
3) Cities lived. Again, we select the top-100 cities in
which most users in the Google+ dataset claimed they
have lived in. After we manually merge the cities that ac-
tually refer to the same one, we obtain 70 distinct cities.
8% of users have at least one of these attribute values.
Table 1: Basic statistics of our SBA.
#nodes #links
social behavior attri. social behavior attri.
1,111,905 48,706 210 5,328,308 3,635,231 269,997
Summary and limitations: In total, we consider 210
popular distinct attribute values, including 62 majors,
78 employers, and 70 cities. We acknowledge that our
Google+ dataset might not be a representative sample of
the recent entire Google+ social network, and thus the in-
ference attack success rates obtained in our experiments
might not represent those of the entire Google+ social
network.
6.2 Crawling Google Play
There are 7 categories of items in Google Play. They
are apps, tv, movies, music, books, newsstand, and de-
vices. Google Play provides two review mechanisms for
users to provide feedback on an item. They are the lik-
ing mechanism and the rating mechanism. In the liking
mechanism, a user simply clicks a like button to express
his preference about an item. In the rating mechanism, a
user gives a rating score which is in the set {1,2,3,4,5}
as well as a detailed comment to support his/her rating.
A score of 1 represents low preference and a score of 5
represents high preference. We call a user reviewed an
item if the user rated or liked the item.
User reviews are publicly available in Google Play.
Specifically, after a user u logs in Google Play, u can
view the list of items reviewed by any user v once u can
obtain v’s Google ID. We crawled the list of items re-
viewed by each user in the Google+ dataset.
We find that 33% of users in the Google+ dataset have
reviewed at least one item. In total, we collected 260,245
items and 3,954,822 reviews. Since items with too few
reviews might not be informative to distinguish users
with different attribute values, we use items that were re-
viewed by at least 5 users. After preprocessing, we have
48,706 items and 3,635,231 reviews.
6.3 Constructing SBA Networks
We take each user in the Google+ dataset as a social node
and links between them as social links. For each item in
our Google Play dataset, we add a corresponding behav-
ior node. If a user reviewed an item, we create a link be-
tween the corresponding social node and the correspond-
ing behavior node. That a user reviewed an item means
that the user once used the item. Using similar items
could indicate similar interests, user characteristics, and
user attributes. To predict attribute values, we further
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add additional attribute nodes to represent attribute val-
ues, and we create a link between a social node and an
attribute node if the user has the attribute value. Table 1
shows the basic statistics of our constructed SBA for pre-
dicting attribute values.
In this work, we set the weights of all links in the SBA
to be 1. Therefore, our attacking result represents a lower
bound on what an attacker can achieve in practice. An
attacker could leverage machine learning techniques (we
discuss one in Section 8) to learn link weights to further
improve success rates.
7 Experiments
7.1 Experimental Setup
We describe the metrics we adopt to evaluate various at-
tacks, training and testing, and parameter settings.
Evaluation metrics: All attacks we evaluate essentially
assign a score for each candidate attribute value. Given a
targeted user v, we predict top-K candidate attribute val-
ues that have the highest scores for each attribute includ-
ing major, employer, and cities lived. We use Precision,
Recall, and F-score to evaluate the top-K predictions. In
particular, Precision is the fraction of predicted attribute
values that belong to v. Recall is the fraction of v’s at-
tribute values that are among the predicted K attribute
values. We address score ties in the manner described by
McSherry and Najork [31]. Precision characterizes how
accurate an attacker’s inferences are while Recall char-
acterizes how many user attributes are corrected inferred
by an attacker. In particular, Precision for top-1 predic-
tion is the fraction of users that the attacker can correctly
infer at least one attribute value. F-score is the harmonic
mean of Precision and Recall, i.e., we have
F-score =
2 ·Precision ·Recall
Precision+Recall
.
Moreover, we average the three metrics over all targeted
users. For convenience, we will also use P, R, and F to
represent Precision, Recall, and F-Score, respectively.
We also define performance gain and relative perfor-
mance gain of one attack A over another attack B to
compare their relative performances. We take Precision
as an example to show their definitions as follows:
Performance gain:
∆P = PrecisionA −PrecisionB
Relative performance gain:
∆P% =
PrecisionA −PrecisionB
PrecisionB
×100%
Training and testing: For each attribute value, we sam-
ple 5 users uniformly at random from the users that have
the attribute value and have reviewed at least 5 items, and
we treat them as test (i.e., targeted) users. In total, we
have around 1,050 test users. For test users, we remove
their attribute links from the SBA network and use them
as groundtruth. We repeat the experiments 10 times and
average the evaluation metrics over the 10 trials.
Parameter settings: In the dividing step, we set
equal shares for social neighbors, behavior-sharing social
neighbors, and attribute-sharing social neighbors, i.e.,
wS = wBS = wAS = 13 . The number of iterations to com-
pute the vote capacity vector is d = blog |Vs|c=20, after
which the vote capacity vector converges. Unless other-
wise stated, we set the backtracking strength α = 0.1.
7.2 Compared Attacks
We compare VIAL with friend-based attacks, behavior-
based attacks, and attacks that use both social structures
and behaviors. These attacks essentially assign a score
for each candidate attribute value, and return the K at-
tribute values that have the highest scores. Suppose v is
a test user and a is an attribute value, and we denote by
S(v,a) the score assigned to a for v.
Random: This baseline method computes the fraction
of users in the training dataset that have a certain attribute
value a, and it treats such fraction as the score S(v,a) for
all test users.
Friend-based attacks: We compare with three friend-
based attacks, i.e., CN-SAN, AA-SAN, and RWwR-
SAN [15]. They were shown to outperform previous at-
tacks such as LINK [46, 15].
• CN-SAN. S(v,a) is the number of common social
neighbors between v and a.
• AA-SAN. This attack weights the importance of
each common social neighbor between v and a pro-
portional to the inverse of the log of its number of
neighbors. Formally, S(v,a) = ∑u∈Γv,S∩Γa,S
1
log|Γu| .
• RWwR-SAN. RWwR-SAN augments the social
network with additional attribute nodes. Then it per-
forms a random walk that is initialized from the test
user v on the augmented graph. The stationary prob-
ability of the attribute node that corresponds to a is
treated as the score S(v,a).
Behavior-based attacks: We also evaluate three
behavior-based attacks.
• Logistic regression (LG-B-I) [42]. LG-B-I treats
each attribute value as a class and learns a multi-
class logistic regression classifier with the training
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Figure 3: Precision, Recall, and F-Score for inferring majors. Although these attacks do not have temporal
orderings, we connect them via curves in the figures to better contrast them.
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Figure 4: Precision, Recall, and F-Score for inferring employers.
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Figure 5: Precision, Recall, and F-Score for inferring cities.
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Table 2: Performance gains and relative performance
gains of RWwR-SAN over other friend-based attacks,
where K = 1. Results are averaged over all attributes.
We find that RWwR-SAN is the best friend-based at-
tack.
Attack ∆P ∆P% ∆R ∆R% ∆F ∆F%
CN-SAN 0.07 24% 0.04 24% 0.05 24%
AA-SAN 0.08 26% 0.04 26% 0.05 26%
Table 3: Performance gains and relative performance
gains of VIAL-B over other behavior-based attacks,
where K = 1. We find that VIAL-B is the best
behavior-based attack.
Attack ∆P ∆P% ∆R ∆R% ∆F ∆F%
LG-B-I 0.06 42% 0.04 47% 0.05 45%
LG-B-II 0.07 47% 0.05 52% 0.06 50%
dataset. Specifically, LG-B-I extracts a feature vec-
tor whose length is the number of items for each
user that has review data, and a feature has a value
of the rating score that the user gave to the corre-
sponding item. Google Play allows users to rate or
like an item, and we treat a liking as a rating score
of 5. For a test user, the learned logistic regression
classifier returns a posterior probability distribution
over the possible attribute values, which are used as
the scores S(v,a). Weinsberg et al. [42] showed that
logistic regression classifier outperforms other clas-
sifiers including SVM [10] and Naive Bayes [29].
• Logistic regression with binary features (LG-B-
II) [25]. The difference between LG-B-II and LG-
B-I is that LG-B-II extracts binary feature vectors
for users. Specifically, a feature has a value of 1 if
the user has reviewed the corresponding item.
• VIAL-B. A variant of VIAL that only uses behavior
data. Specifically, we remove social links from the
SBA network and perform our VIAL attack using
the remaining links.
Attacks combining social structures and behav-
iors: Intuitively, we can combine social structures and
behaviors via concatenating social structure features with
behavior features. We compare with two such attacks.
• Logistic regression (LG-I). LG-I extracts a binary
feature vector whose length is the number of users
from social structures for each user, and a feature
has a value of 1 if the user is a friend of the person
that corresponds to the feature. Then LG-I concate-
nates this feature vector with the one used in LG-B-I
and learns multi-class logistic regression classifiers.
Table 4: Performance gains and relative performance
gains of VIAL over other attacks combining social
structures and behaviors, where K = 1. We find that
VIAL substantially outperforms other attacks.
Attack ∆P ∆P% ∆R ∆R% ∆F ∆F%
LG-I 0.17 61% 0.10 65% 0.13 63%
LG-II 0.18 65% 0.11 69% 0.13 67%
Table 5: Performance gains and relative performance
gains of VIAL over Random, RWwR-SAN (the best
friend-based attack), and VIAL-B (the best behavior-
based attack), where K = 1.
Attack ∆P ∆P% ∆R ∆R% ∆F ∆F%
Random 0.36 526% 0.22 535% 0.27 534%
RWwR-SAN 0.07 20% 0.05 23% 0.06 22%
VIAL-B 0.22 102% 0.13 99% 0.16 100%
• Logistic regression with binary features (LG-II).
LG-II concatenates the binary social structure fea-
ture vector with the binary behavior feature vector
used by LG-B-II.
We use the popular package LIBLINEAR [12] to learn
logistic regression classifiers.
7.3 Results
Fig. 3-Fig. 5 demonstrate the Precision, Recall, and F-
score for top-K inference of major, employer, and city,
where K = 1,2,3. Table 2-Table 5 compare different at-
tacks using results that are averaged over all attributes.
Our metrics are averaged over 10 trials. We find that
standard deviations of the metrics are very small, and
thus we do not show them for simplicity. Next, we de-
scribe several key observations we have made from these
results.
Comparing friend-based attacks: We find that
RWwR-SAN performs the best among the friend-based
attacks. Our observation is consistent with the previ-
ous work [15]. To better illustrate the difference be-
tween the friend-based attacks, we show the performance
gains and relative performance gains of RWwR-SAN
over other friend-based attacks in Table 2. Please refer
to Section 7.1 for formal definitions of (relative) perfor-
mance gains. The (relative) performance gains are aver-
aged over all attributes (i.e., major, employer, and city).
The reason why RWwR-SAN outperforms other friend-
based attacks is that RWwR-SAN performs a random
walk among the augmented graph, which better lever-
ages the graph structure, while other attacks simply count
the number of common neighbors or weighted common
neighbors.
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Figure 6: Impact of the backtracking strength on the
Precision of VIAL for inferring cities. We observe
that backtracking substantially improves VIAL’s per-
formance.
Comparing behavior-based attacks: We find that
VIAL-B performs the best among the behavior-based
attacks. Table 3 shows the average performance gains
and relative performance gains of VIAL-B over other
behavior-based attacks. Our results indicate that our
graph-based attack is a better way to leverage behavior
structures, compared to LG-B-I and LG-B-II, which flat-
ten the behavior structures into feature vectors. More-
over, LG-B-I and LG-B-II achieve very close perfor-
mances, which indicates that the rating scores carry little
information about user attributes.
Comparing attacks combining social structure and
behavior: We find that VIAL performs the best among
the attacks combining social structures and behaviors.
Table 4 shows the average performance gains and rela-
tive performance gains of VIAL over other attacks. Our
results imply that, compared to flattening the structures
into feature vectors, our graph-based attack can better in-
tegrate social structures and user behaviors.
Comparing VIAL with the best friend-based attack
and the best behavior-based attack: Table 4 shows
the average performance gains and relative performance
gains of VIAL over Random, the best friend-based at-
tack, and the best behavior-based attack. We find that
VIAL significantly outperforms these attacks, indicating
the importance of combining social structures and be-
haviors to perform attribute inference. This implies that,
when an attacker wants to attack user privacy via infer-
ring their private attributes, the attacker can successfully
attack substantially more users using VIAL.
Impact of backtracking strength: Fig. 6 shows the im-
pact of backtracking strength on the Precision of VIAL
for inferring cities. According to Theorem 1, VIAL with
α = 1 reduces to random guessing, and thus we do not
show the corresponding result in the figure. α = 0 cor-
responds to the case in which VIAL does not use back-
tracking. We observe that not using backtracking sub-
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Figure 7: Impact of the number of reviewed items on
the Precision of our attack VIAL for inferring cities.
We observe that, when users share more behaviors,
our attack is able to more accurately predict their at-
tributes.
stantially decreases the performance of VIAL. The rea-
son might be that 1) α = 0 makes VIAL predict the same
attribute values for all test users, according to Theorem 2,
and 2) a user’ attributes are close to the user in the SBA
network and backtracking makes it more likely for votes
to be distributed among these attribute nodes. Moreover,
we find that inference accuracies are stable across dif-
ferent backtracking strengths once they are larger than
0. The reason is that when we increase the backtrack-
ing strength, attribute values receive different votes, but
the ones with top ranked votes only change slightly. We
observe similar results for other attributes.
Impact of the number of reviewed items: Figure 7
shows the Precision as a function of the number of re-
viewed items for inferring cities lived. We average Preci-
sions for test users whose number of reviewed items falls
under a certain interval (i.e., [5,20), [20,35), [35,50), or
≥ 50). We observe that our attack can more accurately
infer attributes for users who share more digital behav-
iors (i.e., reviewed items in our case).
Confidence estimation: Figure 8 shows the trade-off
between the Precision and the fraction of users that are
attacked via our confidence estimator. We observe that
an attacker can increase the Precision (K = 1) of infer-
ring cities from 0.57 to over 0.92 if the attacker attacks
a half of the test users that are selected via confidence
estimation. We also tried the confidence estimator called
gap statistic [34], in which the confidence score for a
targeted user is the difference between the score of the
highest ranked attribute value and the score of the second
highest ranked one. Our confidence estimator slightly
outperforms gap statistic because a test user could have
multiple attribute values and our attack could produce
close scores for them.
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Figure 8: Confidence estimation: trade-off between
the Precision of our attack and the fraction of test
users that are attacked. An attacker can substantially
improve the attack success rates when attacking less
users that are selected by our confidence estimator.
8 Discussion
This work focuses on propagating vote capacity among
the SBA network with given link weights, and our
method VIAL is applicable to any link weights. How-
ever, it is an interesting future work to learn the link
weights, which could further improve the attacker’s suc-
cess rates. In the following, we discuss one possible ap-
proach to learn link weights. Phase I of VIAL essentially
iteratively computes the vote capacity vector according
to Equation 7. Therefore, Phase 1 of VIAL can be
viewed as performing a random walk with a restart [40]
on the subgraph consisting of social nodes and social
links, where the matrix MT and α are the transition ma-
trix and restart probability of the random walk, respec-
tively. Therefore, the attacker could adapt supervised
random walk [3] to learn the link weights. Specifically,
the attacker already has a set of users with publicly avail-
able attributes and the attacker can use them as a training
dataset to learn the link weights; the attacker removes
these attributes from the SBA network as ground truth,
and the link weights are learnt such that VIAL can pre-
dict attributes for these users the most accurately.
9 Related Work
Friend-based attribute inference: He et al. [18] trans-
formed attribute inference to Bayesian inference on a
Bayesian network that is constructed using the social
links between users. They evaluated their method us-
ing a LiveJournal social network dataset with synthesized
user attributes. Moreover, it is well known in the ma-
chine learning community that Bayesian inference is not
scalable. Lindamood et al. [27] modified Naive Bayes
classifier to incorporate social links and other attributes
of users to infer some attribute. For instance, to infer
a user’s major, their method used the user’s other at-
tributes such as employer and cities lived, the user’s so-
cial friends and their attributes. However, their approach
is not applicable to users that share no attributes at all.
Zheleva and Getoor [46] studied various approaches to
consider both social links and groups that users joined to
perform attribute inference. They found that, with only
social links, the approach LINK achieves the best per-
formance. LINK represents each user as a binary fea-
ture vector, and a feature has a value of 1 if the user is a
friend of the person that corresponds to the feature. Then
LINK learns classifiers for attribute inference using these
feature vectors. Gong et al. [15] transformed attribute
inference to a link prediction problem. Moreover, they
showed that their approaches CN-SAN, AA-SAN, and
RWwR-SAN outperform LINK.
Mislove et al. [33] proposed to identify a local com-
munity in the social network by taking some seed users
that share the same attribute value, and then they pre-
dicted all users in the local community to have the shared
attribute value. Their approach is not able to infer at-
tributes for users that are not in any local communities.
Moreover, this approach is data dependent since detected
communities might not correlate with the attribute value.
For instance, Trauda et al. [41] found that communities
in a MIT male network are correlated with residence but
a female network does not have such property.
Thomas et al. [39] studied the inference of attributes
such as gender, political views, and religious views.
They used multi-label classification methods and lever-
aged features from users’ friends and wall posts. More-
over, they proposed the concept of multi-party privacy to
defend against attribute inference.
Behavior-based attribute inference: Weinsberg et
al. [42] investigated the inference of gender using the
rating scores that users gave to different movies. In par-
ticular, they constructed a feature vector for each user;
the ith entry of the feature vector is the rating score that
the user gave to the ith movie if the user reviewed the
ith movie, otherwise the ith entry is 0. They compared a
few classifiers including Logistic Regression (LG) [22],
SVM [10], and Naive Bayes [29], and they found that LG
outperforms the other approaches. Bhagat et al. [6] stud-
ied attribute inference in an active learning framework.
Specifically, they investigated which movies we should
ask users to review in order to improve the inference ac-
curacy the most. However, this approach might not be
applicable in real-world scenarios because users might
not be interested in reviewing the selected movies.
Chaabane et al. [8] used the information about the mu-
sics users like to infer attributes. They augmented the
musics with the corresponding Wikipedia pages and then
used topic modeling techniques to identify the latent sim-
ilarities between musics. A user is predicted to share
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attributes with those that like similar musics with the
user. Kosinski et al. [25] tried to infer various attributes
based on the list of pages that users liked on Facebook.
Similar to the work performed by Weinsberg et al. [42],
they constructed a feature vector from the Facebook likes
and used Logistic Regression to train classifiers to dis-
tinguish users with different attributes. Luo et al. [28]
constructed a model to infer household structures using
users’ viewing behaviors in Internet Protocol Television
(IPTV) systems, and they showed promising results.
Other approaches: Bonneau et al. [7] studied the ex-
traction of private user data in online social networks via
various attacks such as account compromise, malicious
applications, and fake accounts. These attacks can not
infer user attributes that users do not provide in their pro-
files, while our attack can. Otterbacher [35] studied the
inference of gender using users’ writing styles. Zamal
et al. [45] used a user’s tweets and her neighbors’ tweets
to infer attributes. They didn’t consider social structures
nor user behaviors. Gupta et al. [17] tried to infer inter-
ests of a Facebook user via sentiment-oriented mining on
the Facebook pages that were liked by the user. Zhong
et al. [47] demonstrated the possibility of inferring user
attributes using the list of locations where the user has
checked in. These studies are orthogonal to ours since
they exploited information sources other than the social
structures and behaviors that we focus on.
Attribute inference using social structure and behav-
ior could also be solved by a social recommender sys-
tem (e.g., [44]). However, such approaches have higher
computational complexity than our method for attacking
a targeted user, and it is challenging for them to have
theoretical guarantees as our attack. For instance, the ap-
proach proposed by Ye et al. [44] has a time complexity
of O(m · k · f · d) on a single machine, where m is the
number of edges, k is the latent topic size, f is the aver-
age number of friends, and d is the number of iterations.
Note that both our VIAL and this approach can be paral-
lelized on a cluster.
10 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we study the problem of attribute inference
via combining social structures and user behaviors that
are publicly available in online social networks. To this
end, we first propose a social-behavior-attribute (SBA)
network model to gracefully integrate social structures,
user behaviors, and their interactions with user attributes.
Based on the SBA network model, we design a vote dis-
tribution attack (VIAL) to perform attribute inference.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack both the-
oretically and empirically. In particular, via empirical
evaluations on a real-world large scale dataset with 1.1
million users, we find that attribute inference is a se-
rious practical privacy attack to online social network
users and an attacker can successfully attack more users
when considering both social structures and user behav-
iors. The fundamental reason why our attack succeeds is
that private user attributes are statistically correlated with
publicly available information, and our attack captures
such correlations to map publicly available information
to private user attributes.
A few interesting directions for future work include
learning the link weights of a SBA network, generalizing
VIAL to infer hidden social relationships between users,
as well as defending against our inference attacks.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
According to Equation 7, we have:
~s(i)v = (1−α)i(MT )i~s(0)v +α(
i−1
∑
k=0
(1−α)k(MT )k)~ev.
(12)
Therefore,
lim
i→∞
~s(i)v = lim
i→∞
α(
i−1
∑
k=0
(1−α)k(MT )k)~ev
= α(I− (1−α)MT )−1~ev. (13)
We note that the matrix (I− (1−α)MT ) is nonsingular
because it is strictly diagonally dominant.
B Proof of Theorem 2
The matrix M has non-negative entries, and each row of
M sums to be 1. Therefore, M can be viewed as a tran-
sition matrix. In particular, M can be viewed as a tran-
sition matrix of the following Markov chain on the SBA
network: each social node is a state of the Markov chain;
the transition probability from a social node u to another
social node x is Mux, i.e., a social node u can only tran-
sit to its social neighbors or hop-2 social neighbors with
non-zero probabilities.
When the SBA network is connected, the above
Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic. Therefore,
the Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution
~pi . Moreover, according to the Perron-Frobenius theo-
rem [36], we have:
lim
i→∞
(MT )i = [~pi ~pi · · ·~pi]
When α = 0, we have~s(i)v = (MT )i~s
(0)
v . Thus, we have
~sv = lim
i→∞
~s(i)v
= lim
i→∞
(MT )i~s(0)v
= [~pi ~pi · · ·~pi]~s(0)v
= |Vs|~pi,
where |Vs| is the sum of the entries of~s(0)v .
C Proof of Corollary 1
When wS = τ ·du,S, wBS = τ ·du,B, and wAS = τ ·du,A for
each user u, the Markov chain defined by the transition
matrix M is a random walk on a weighted graph Gw =
(Vw,Ew), which is defined as follows: Vw = Vs, an edge
(u,x) in Ew means that x is u’s social neighbor or hop-
2 social neighbor in the SBA network, and the weight of
the edge (u,x)∈ Ew is δux,S ·wux+δux,BS ·du,B ·wB(u,x)+
δux,AS · du,A ·wA(u,x). We can verify that, on the graph
Gw, the weights of all edges that are incident to a node u
sum to du. Therefore, the stationary distribution ~pi [5] of
the random walk on Gw is:
~pi = [
du1
D
du2
D
· · ·
du|Vs |
D
]T . (14)
Thus, according to Theorem 2, we have~svu = |Vs| duD .
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